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Using panel data models and the seven available waves of the Health and Retirement 
Study, we look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal 
retirement age on retirement expectations of workers aged 51 to 61 – their probabilities to 
work past age 62 and 65 as well as the age at which they expect to start claiming old age 
social security benefits.. We use administrative records linked to the HRS to create 
variables that accurately reflect the change in financial incentives. For men, we find 
results in line with theoretical predictions on the probability to work after age 65. For 
example, men whose marginal wage rate increased when the earnings test was repealed, 
showed the largest increase in the probability to work full-time past normal retirement 
age. For women, we do not find significant results, possibly due to omitting spouse 
benefits and their interaction with the earnings test. We also do not find significant 
evidence of effects of the repeal of the earnings test on the probability to work past age 
62 or the expected claiming age. On the other hand, for those reaching the normal 
retirement age, deviations between the age at which Social Security benefits are actually 
claimed and the previously reported expected age are more negative in 2000 than in 
1998, suggesting that the repeal has increased claiming immediately after reaching 
normal retirement age. Since our calculations show that the tax introduced by the 
earnings test was small when accounting for actuarial benefit adjustments and differential 
mortality, our results suggest that although workers form expectations in a way consistent 
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 While several papers study the effect of the social security earnings test on actual 
retirement (e.g., Leonesio, 1990; Haider and Loughran, 2005), little is known about how 
workers in their late fifties or early sixties who are not yet affected by the earnings test 
adjust their retirement plans and expectations in response to such an earnings test taxing 
away earnings later in life. The Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000 provides 
an excellent example of a natural experiment that can be used to look at this issue, 
involving a change in the effective tax structure across age groups. We analyze the effect 
of the repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age (NRA) in 2000 on 
expectations about employment and social security claiming after NRA of those who 
were younger than NRA at the time of the repeal.  
 Recent studies looking at the earnings test find large responses to the earnings test 
in terms of labor supply, earnings, claiming of benefits as well “bunching” of workers’ 
earnings at the minimum exempt amount (Friedberg, 2000; Tran, 2004; Haider and 
Loughran, 2005). This is despite the fact that benefits lost due to the earnings test are 
reimbursed at a later age trough an actuarial adjustment. This actuarial adjustment is 
generally believed to be actuarially fair for recent cohorts. One interpretation of this 
finding is that workers are simply myopic instead of forward looking. A necessary 
condition for workers to be forward-looking is that the expectations of their future 
behavior respond to changes in the incentive structure over the life-cycle. If forward 
looking workers in their late fifties and early sixties are aware of the repeal of the 
earnings test, they may adjust the expectations about their future labor market behavior. 
They may also change their current behavior and for example substitute labor supply 
intertemporally so as to maximize lifetime utility.  In the end, the desirability of the 
earnings test depends on its disincentive effects on lifetime labor supply and wealth.3 
Hence, looking at changes in expectations following the repeal contributes to 
understanding better the life-cycle responses to the rules of a program like the Old Age 
Social Insurance benefits but also to understanding how workers’ plans for retirement are 
affected by the tax structure. 
                                                 
3 Other considerations on the desirability of the earnings test include whether its elimination would induce 
workers to retire “too early”, not taking into account the lower benefits level (Gruber and Orszag, 2003). 
This could have damaging implications for poverty in old age.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2004)  point to 
the fact that the elimination of the earnings test could affect the short-term viability of the Social Security 
Trust Fund. 
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 This paper first documents the size of the taxes induced by the earnings test in the 
population covered by the Health and Retirement Study, using administrative earnings 
records from the Social Security Administration. These calculations take account of the 
actuarial adjustment and allow for differential mortality profiles using survival 
probabilities accounting for the heterogeneity in subjective mortality beliefs elicited in 
the HRS. Second, we look at the effect of the repeal of the earnings test on expectations 
of workers not yet directly affected by the test in 2000. We consider expectations to work 
full-time past ages 62 and 65 as well as the age at which workers expect to start 
collecting Social Security benefits. We also look at the extent to which workers later 
deviate from these expectations because of the repeal of the earnings test. The 
identification strategy makes use of the pre-repeal tax rates calculated in the first step. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we first discuss the 
nature of the earnings test and sketch a stylized life-cycle framework of individual 
behavior that helps to understand how people can react to eliminating the earnings test in 
a static and in a life-cycle setting. Then we discuss the expectations variables we want to 
analyze and present some descriptive statistics for the time periods before and after the 
policy change, illustrating the fact that there have been substantial changes in retirement 
expectations (section 3). Section 4 discusses the construction of the financial incentive 
variables from administrative SSA records linked to HRS, which we use to answer the 
question whether the earnings test is a still a tax when the actuarial adjustment is taken 
into account. In section 5, we present the estimates of some empirical models for panel 
data, based on a difference in differences approach and random effects panel data models. 
That approach rests on the tax rates constructed in Section 4. Section 6 looks at the effect 
of elimination of the earnings test on actual behavior, particularly the actual age at which 
people start claiming Social Security benefits. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. The Earnings Test and Its Potential Effects on Labor Supply 
Details on the rules of Old Age Social Insurance (OASI) benefits since its 
inception in 1951, including the working of earnings tests for several age groups, are 
presented in Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2005). Here we focus on the features that are 
relevant for our study on the effect of eliminating the earnings test for the age group 65-
70 in 2000. These are presented in Table 1. 
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 To be more precise, the earnings test was abolished for people above the normal 
retirement age (NRA),4 which was 65 years in 2000, but has been gradually increased 
since 2003. It was 65 years and 4 months for individuals turning 65 in 2004 and will be 
65 years and 10 months for those reaching age 65 in 2007. An earnings test still applies 
for OASI benefits received before NRA. As shown in Table 1, if someone claims OASI 
benefits before reaching NRA, the OASI benefit is reduced by one US dollar of every 
two dollars earned above an exempt amount. This exempt amount grew from $7,440 per 
year in 1992 (the year of the first wave of HRS) up to $11,640 in 2004 in nominal terms.  
A similar test applied until April 7 of the year 2000 to earnings for those who 
claimed benefits and had positive earnings after their NRA.5 The OASI benefit was 
reduced by one dollar for every three dollars earned in excess of the exempt amount, 
which was $ 14,500 in 1998.6 Thus from a static, one period point of view, the earnings 
test is similar to a means tested benefit. In a multi-period setting however, it should be 
kept in mind that someone gets compensated for not receiving OASI benefits in a given 
year by receiving more in the future. This is illustrated in the final two rows of the table. 
If individuals7 postpone claiming for another year and have not yet reached the NRA, 
they get 6.8 percent (ARF, the actuarial reduction factor) higher benefits every year in the 
future than they would get were they to retire and start claiming immediately. On average 
this appears to be an actuarially fair growth rate of future old age benefits. A different 
rate applies after the NRA. Postponing claiming for another year after NRA used to pay 
somewhat less, as is illustrated in the last line of the table (DRC: delayed retirement 
credit). The compensation for postponing claiming in the years after NRA was 7.0% in 
2004 and will eventually reach 8% for future cohorts reaching NRA. The delayed 
                                                 
4 Social Security refers to the Normal Retirement Age as the Full Retirement Age (FRA).  
5 On April 7th 2000, President Clinton signed the “Senior Citizen Freedom to Work Act”. Congress 
approved a preliminary version proposed on March 1st and the Senate approved the amended version on 
March 22nd. The desirability of the reform had already been emphasized in his 1999 State of the Union 
Address: "we should eliminate the limits on what seniors on Social Security can earn.". The vote was 
unanimous in the Senate in favor of the repeal. On March 23rd, the passing of the measure in the Senate 
surfaced in popular media (New York Times, March 23rd 2000). There was some discussion in the regular 
press about the upcoming reform. On February 20th, the New York Times reports that the president already 
signaled his attention to sign the bill if passed which shows that there was little uncertainty about the 
possibility that the law would be in effect before the end of the year. The repeal was in effect for earnings 
after December 31st 1999. 
6 In the year a worker reaches the normal retirement age, there is a special exemption for earnings in that 
calendar year. This exemption was $17,000 in 2000. See §1803.2 of the Social Security Handbook.  
7 For couples, the situation is often more complicated, due to spouse benefits. For those collecting spouse 
benefits, the earnings test is applied on their spouse’s earnings. We ignore this issue in the current paper.  
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retirement credit is roughly fair for younger cohorts, while it was actuarially less than fair 
for older cohorts. For those born prior to 1926, DRC was 3.5%. 
For earnings lost before NRA, the actuarial adjustment starts at NRA. Each full 
monthly check lost gives rise to a one month actuarial adjustment. Hence someone who 
claims at age 62 and loses all his checks in that year because of high earnings will receive 
the same check as someone who claimed at age 63 from the point where they reach NRA 
onwards. Before NRA however, the one who claimed early (and lost his first year 
benefit), will get checks from age 63 to the NRA that do not include the actuarial 
adjustment.  
 
A Two-Period Model 
  Prior to 2000, the actuarial adjustment operated in the same way after the NRA as 
before the NRA. The only difference was that the actuarial adjustment (delayed 
retirement credit), was applied the following year rather than being restricted to after a 
later age. In a static one period model of labor supply, this compensation is ignored. In a 
dynamic framework, optimizing individuals will take this increase in future benefits into 
account when making their labor supply decisions, under the condition that they are 
aware of it. Whether the latter is indeed the case is not so clear, see, e.g., Friedberg 
(2000) who argues that their labor supply behavior reveals that they are not.  Gruber and 
Orszag (2003) show that in one of the leading tax guides, no mention of the actuarial 
adjustment is made. To understand the labor supply effects of the earnings test in a 
dynamic framework, we construct a simple two-period model along the lines of Disney 
and Smith (2001). Spouses and spouse benefits are ignored. For convenience, we present 
the model for a single male.     
For simplicity, assume individuals make decisions over two periods. In period 1, 
the individual can decide to claim OASI benefits or not, and can also choose hours of 
work h. In period 2, the individual claims in any case (whether he was claiming in period 
1 or not), and does not work. The hourly wage rate in the first period is denoted by w. If 
he was claiming already in period 1, the individual gets pension 1P  in period 2. Define 
2 1 0P P Pδ= +  to be the benefit if the individual delays claiming to period 2. The actuarial 
adjustment factor is 0δ ≥ . Individuals discount period 2 income at a rate 0θ ≥  (which 
includes mortality risk). Hence, the adjustment is perceived as unfavorable if 1/δ θ< ,  in 
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which case the individual prefers income 0P  in the first period to 0Pδ  in the second 
period. The case where an individual is myopic is represented by 0θ = . In this case, the 
individual does not consider future consequences of current decisions. 
If the individual does not claim in the first period, the total discounted value of 
income is  
 2Y wh Pθ= +  (1) 
If the individual decides to claim and work in the first period, income can be affected by 
the earnings test. The earnings test rule is defined by two parameters: the maximum 
earnings allowed without being taxed E (the exempt amount) and the rate at which 
benefits are taxed away by the earnings test for each dollar above E, the “tax rate” τ.   
 Three situations can occur depending on how many hours the individual decides 
to work.  
If /h E w< , the earnings test does not reduce benefits, and the present value of 
total income is 
 0 1Y wh P Pθ= + +  (2) 
If hours are above the threshold (or, in other words, earnings are above E), benefits are 
reduced. The reduction is ( )e wh Eτ= − up to complete exhaustion of the benefit 0P . 





( / ) /
P wh E







If the benefit is completely lost, the individual gets 2 1 0P P Pδ= +  in the second period, the 
same as if he would not have claimed. Define 0/e Pπ = , the fraction of the benefit lost in 
period 1. Hence, if benefits are not completely taxed away, the partial adjustment yields a 
benefit in the second period of   1 0P Pπδ+ . SSA calculates the partial adjustments based 
on the number of months no check was collected. On the segment /h E w≥  and maxh h< , 
the present value of total  income over the two periods is thus given by 
 
 1 1 0( ( )) ( )Y wh P wh E P Pτ θ πδ= + − − + +  (3) 
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Finally, an individual who works more than maxh gets 
 
 2Y wh Pθ= + . (4) 
 
Note that (1) and (4) are equivalent in the case where desired hours are so high 
that it exhausts all benefits. This would not be true if there was no actuarial adjustment 
under the earnings test. In that case, we would essentially have 0π =  instead of 0/e Pπ = . 
This will also be the relevant case for individuals who realize that they get a 
compensation for postponing claiming ( 0δ > ) but do not realize that they are 
compensated in the same way if they have started to claim but their benefits are partially 
or completely taxed away by the earnings test; such individuals will base their decisions 
on the perception that π equals zero. 
For individuals who do not intend to work in period 1 or for those who want to 
work few hours such that their earnings are below the maximum allowed under the 
earnings test, it may still be profitable to delay claiming rather than to claim immediately. 
This is the case if the actuarial adjustment 1Pδ  is large enough to compensate for the lost 
benefits 0P . In this two period model, the condition for this is 1/δ θ> , i.e., the individual 
perceives the compensation for delayed claiming as more than fair.  
To illustrate how expected income is affected by the earnings test, we consider the 
following example, corresponding to the situation of a worker at the normal retirement 
age having a $20 wage rate per hour and a pension entitlement of 10,000$ in the first and 
the second period (with the latter excluding the potential adjustment if less than the full 
benefit is claimed in period 1).  We consider his decision just prior to the repeal of the 
earnings test at the normal retirement age. The tax rate is 33% and the exempt earnings 
maximum E  is $14,500. The individual’s subjective discount rate θ is assumed to be 0.97 
and the actuarial adjustment δ is 0.75 which is perceived as unfair (1/0.97=1.0302>0.75). 
We consider two situations when the individual is claiming in the first period. One is the 
actual situation where adjustment due to the earnings test is possible ( 0π > ) and the 
other one is the situation where the individual is unaware of the adjustment in case the 





20,  14,500,  0.75









Figure 1 presents this individual’s “budget set”, i.e., the present value of 
perceived total income as a function of hours of leisure (3000-hours of work) in period 1. 
If the individual does not claim in period 1 (dashed line), the budget set is linear (taxes 
are ignored in this stylized model). In the other two cases, the budget set is piecewise 
linear, with kinks at min / 725h E w= =  hours of work (2275 hours of leisure) and 
max min 0 /( ) 2225h h P wτ= + = (775 hours of leisure). The slopes of the flatter part in the 
middle, however, are quite different. If 0π = , the slope is (1 )wτ− =13.33, since the 
individual perceives no compensation for the benefits that are taxed away. In this case, 
the individual may easily think that it is better not to claim. In the actual situation on the 
other hand, where 0/e Pπ = , the slope is much higher, because of the actuarial 
adjustment. To be precise, the slope in the flatter part is 13.33 18.18wθδτ+ = . The 
difference with the slope of 20 is due to the fact that the individual’s subjective discount 
rate makes the actuarial adjustment unfair, so that the delayed receipt of benefits is still 
seen as a mild tax on earnings.   
Abolishing the earnings test can have different effects on labor supply in the first 
time period, depending on where the individual would be on the budget curve in the 
presence of the earnings test and depending on whether or not he claims in the first 
period. 
First consider someone who is claiming benefits in the presence of the earnings 
test, and works more than maxh hours (group A). Abolishing the earnings test will not 
change his marginal wage rate, but will have a negative income effect, since the benefit is 
completely taxed away under the earnings test. Hence, the repeal will reduce the work 
effort of this individual.  
Next consider the group who claim benefits and work between min /h E w=  and 
maxh in the presence of the earnings test (group B). This is the group which has some 
benefits taxed away by the earnings test. In this case, there is both a substitution and an 
income effect from abolishing the earnings test. With no earnings test, the worker gets 
more income which should reduce hours worked (an income effect). On the other hand, 
the increased marginal reward from an additional hour of work may also give him an 
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incentive to increase labor supply (substitution effect). Hence the total effect is 
ambiguous.  
Individuals just above or exactly at the kink minh  will want to work if the earnings 
test is eliminated, since for them, there is hardly any income effect. The income effect 
will be larger if the individual is closer to maxh . We thus expect a positive effect on labor 
supply for those close to or at minh , and a smaller positive or possibly even negative effect 
for those close to maxh . In our empirical work, we will exploit information from SSA 
earnings records to determine where individuals are before the earnings test is repealed 
and how close the respondents actually are to the two kinks. 
For the group who claim benefits in period 1 and work less than minh (group C), 
the earnings test is irrelevant – these people have, in the presence of the earnings test, so 
little earnings that the earnings test does not lead to reduced benefits. Their behavior will 
not change if the earnings test is abolished.8  
Finally, consider the respondents who do not claim benefits as long as the 
earnings test applies. One reason for not claiming may be that actuarial adjustment is 
considered favorable, 1/δ θ> . In this case, abolishing the earnings test will not have any 
effect – this group (group D) will also not claim if the earnings test is eliminated. 
A second group of non-claimants are those who perceive the actuarial adjustment 
as unfavorable ( 1/δ θ< ) but misinterpret the rules of the earnings test and perceive 
0π =  (group E). Their perceived budget set in case of claiming will change if the 
earnings test is abolished, and this may induce them to start claiming. In figure 1, these 
are the people on the dashed line who work more than (approximately) 1200 hours – for 
them, as long as the earnings test applies, the present value of total income is perceived as 
higher if they do not claim. This changes if the earnings test is abolished. They will then 
claim and reduce their working hours due to a negative income effect. (There is no 




                                                 
8 In practice, measurement error or rigidities may imply that respondents are observed below the kink but 
actually are at the kink. In that case, abolishing the earnings test will have a positive effect on their labor 
supply (as in group B). 
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3. Data 
We use the Health and Retirement Study using all available cohorts in the waves 
1992 - 2004. Table 2 presents the design of the complete HRS, illustrating when 
respondents were interviewed and how old they were at the time of the repeal. The 
original HRS cohort born 1931-1941 was first interviewed in 1992, the AHEAD cohort 
born before 1923 entered in 1993, the War Babies (born 1942-1947) and Child of 
Depression Age (CODA, born 1924-1930) entered in 1998, and the Early Boomers (EB, 
born 1948-1953) first participated in 2004, the last available wave. As Table 2 shows, the 
cohort directly affected by the repeal is the original HRS cohort, for whom the normal 
retirement age was 65. When the earnings test was repealed in 2000, respondents of this 
cohort were between 59 and 69 years old. There is some heterogeneity in the delayed 
retirement credit available to workers who will be affected in the HRS cohort (from 
5.12% to 6.70% in 2002). 
Moreover, although their NRA is clearly after the year of the repeal, expectations 
of younger workers, particularly those in the War Babies cohort, can also be affected by 
the repeal. The delayed retirement they face, however, is more advantageous than the one 
their predecessors faced. Thus if they were aware of the DRC before the repeal and do 
not face liquidity constraints, the repeal is less likely to have had a large effect on them.      
 
3.1 Match with Social Security Earnings Records 
In order to obtain exact information on OASI entitlements and how these are 
affected by earnings and claiming decisions, we link respondent records with their 
earnings history records from Social Security. This has the advantage that we can 
accurately compute social security incentives faced by respondents. Without such 
records, it is difficult to capture life-time earnings (on which social security benefits are 
based) without imposing strong assumptions. Measurement error in earnings is an 
important problem when looking at the effects of the earnings test, as shown by Haider 
and Loughran (2005). We use administrative earnings records to compute benefit 
eligibility but also to compute the earnings profile for each respondent. We have access 
to records for the HRS, War Babies and CODA cohorts. The HRS asked respondents in 
1992, 1998, and 2004 for permission to match their earnings records. We do not have 
access to the earnings records data for 2004 yet.  Hence, we have no Social Security 
earnings data for the Early Boomers. 
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There are two potential drawbacks of using earnings record matched with HRS 
respondents. First, Social Security earnings are top-coded at the maximum taxable 
earnings (presently about $90,000). This applies to 6% of respondents’ 1991 (HRS) and 
1999 (for WarBabies and CODA) earnings. If they are subject to the earnings test, most 
of these respondents would already lose their complete social security benefits when 
reaching the lower threshold of $90,000. Hence, the classification of respondents in terms 
of the incentive they face due to the earnings test is hardly affected by that censoring. 
Second, there are a fair number of respondents for whom a match to an SSA 
earnings record is not possible. In the HRS cohort, 75.1% of respondents have a 
successful match. For CODA and War Babies respondents, the match rates are much 
lower (50-60%) than in the original HRS cohort. We will present some descriptive 
statistics for the two groups (those with and those without a match; see Table 4 below). It 
will turn out that in terms of observables the two samples do not differ much. 
We use the Average National Wage Index constructed by the Social Security 
Administration to project earnings into the future. These earnings are needed to compute 
various measures of future retirement incentives. Over the period 1985-2003, the average 
growth rate was roughly 4%. Over the same period, inflation (measured by the Consumer 
Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) was on average 2.9% per year, 
thus yielding an about 1% real growth in earnings. Inevitably, constructing projected 
earnings profile introduces some “measurement” error. The maintained assumptions are 
that workers project to work the same hours as they currently work in the future, and that 
the growth rate of wages is the same across all groups of workers. Neither of these 
assumptions is likely to be completely correct. Still, we expect only a limited gain of 
replacing these projections by forecasts at an individual level. For example, a major 
impediment for forecasting individual earnings using the observed earnings profile in the 
cross-section or the panel is that they will suffer from strong selection due to retirement 
incentives.  
 
3.2 Sample Selection  
For our analysis, we select respondents aged 51 to 61 who report to be working 
for pay. We do this because the expectations questions we will examine are only asked to 
workers. This means we have an unbalanced sample where we follow respondents when 
age eligible and working. In 1992, the entire original HRS cohort is age eligible. In later 
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waves, some HRS respondents have moved out of this age group. Some respondents aged 
51-61 have already retired, but this number is low compared to after age 61 when 
workers become eligible for Social Security benefits on their own earnings record. The 
first major refreshment of the original HRS sample enters in 1998 with the introduction 
of the War Babies cohort, aged 51-56 in 1998. Finally, the Early Boomers refresh the 
sample in 2004. For most of the analysis, we will not use the Early Boomers because we 
do not have Social Security earnings records for them.  
Table 3 gives the number of observations in each wave along with the number of 
observations for which we have Social Security Earnings Records (SS.Er). The sample 
generally gets smaller after 2000 until the Early Boomers cohort come in. The fraction of 
respondents with an SS.Er is large in early years and decreases because of lower match 
rates for War Babies in 1998. The low match rate in 2004 reflects the fact that we do not 
have any SS.Er for the Early Boomers. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of some background variables that we shall 
use in the analysis of expectations in the age 51-61 sample.  
 One aspect of workers’ environment that may be important when analyzing the 
earnings test is the flexibility of their current job. If workers cannot change hours at their 
current employer, they need to change jobs to reduce hours (see, e.g., Hurd, 1996). This 
may be difficult, particularly for workers in their late 60s because demand for workers of 
this age may be lower and search costs may be higher. Some information on job 
flexibility is available in the HRS as of 1996. We use two questions, for which the 
response rate is quite high (in the 90%). The first refers to whether the respondent feels 
pressured by co-workers to retire before 65. This is used to measure the general attitude 
of co-workers (and often employers) to older workers. The other question refers to 
whether the respondent thinks that a transition to a low demanding job is relatively easy 
at his current employer. This measures the flexibility to reduce work pressure, hours, or 
responsibilities at the current job. We code the answers as one (yes) if the respondent 
reports either “strongly agree” or “agree” and zero (no) otherwise. Over all waves, 
approximately one tenth of workers aged 51-61 think they are pressured to retire before 
65 at their current employer. More than one quarter thinks that a transition to a low 
demanding job with the same employer is possible. 
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 Finally, we consider measures of current earnings, accumulated financial wealth 
(liquid = savings, stocks, bonds, CDs, IRAs) as well as real assets such as real estate and 
other assets, and whether the respondent has an occupational pension on his current job 
and, if so, of what type - defined benefit or defined contribution. The AIME is the 
average indexed monthly earnings, a measure of life-time earnings, computed using the 
SS.Er earnings records. It is the monthly equivalent of the average earnings over the 35 
years of highest admissible Social Security earnings. It is the basis for the primary 
insurance amount (PIA) to which a worker is entitled as a benefit at the normal retirement 
age. The PIA is a piece-wise linear function of the AIME with two kink points and 
marginal tax rates of 0.9, 0.4 and 0.1 on the three segments. The median worker between 
age 51 and age 61 had an AIME of $1578 in 1994, compared to $2237 in 2002. These 
amounts are not adjusted for inflation (using the CPI $1578 in 1994 dollars is $1916 in 
2002 dollars). 
Differences in characteristics between the overall sample and the sample with 
matched SS.Er earnings records appear to be relatively small, except for 2004 where the 
entire Early Boomers cohort does not have a match. Apart from this difference, some 
under representation of blacks is found, as well some difference in total financial wealth.  
We focus on three measures of expectations. The first one is the subjective 
probability to work full-time in any period past age 65. This measure is relatively well 
documented, see, e.g., Hurd (1999) and Chan and Stevens (2004). The exact wording of 
the question is “Thinking about work generally and not just your present job, what do you 
think are the chances that you will be working full-time after you reach 65”. The answer 
is a number between 0 and 100 (in 1992 between 0 and 10 which is adjusted). We refer to 
this question as P(65). The question is only asked when the respondent provided a 
positive probability to another probability question that asks for the probability of 
working full-time past age 62. If the answer to this question (P(62)) is zero, P(65) is 
assigned a value of zero as well. Respondents are not asked P(62) and P(65) if they are 62 
or older.9 We will focus on the effect of the repeal of the earnings test after NRA on 
P(65), but will also consider its potential effects on P(62). We expect smaller effects here 
than for P(65), but it may be the case that respondents who change their mind about 
working at age 65 are more likely to keep working between age 62 and age 65, due to the 
costs of labor force exit and entry.  
                                                 
9 There are some exceptions due to routing inconsistencies. 
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The third expectations question we consider is the expected age at which 
respondents expect to claim Social Security benefits. We will denote this variable as EC. 
Values are missing for respondents who reported they did not anticipate receiving any 
Social Security benefits. There is a fair amount of don’t knows as well. Overall, the value 
is missing for 19-24% of the respondents in our sample (varying across waves). Note that 
EC is just a point estimate, if respondents are uncertain it may be the most likely age at 
which they think they can start claiming, or the median or mean of their subjective 
distribution. Thus the information in this point estimate is more ambiguous than the 
information in the probability questions P(62) and P(65) (cf. Manski, 2004).  
Table 5 shows the evolution of expectations over time. Answers to P(65) and EC 
show an upward trend over time in this sample. Of course, we do not know if this is a 
true time effect because the composition of the sample changes over waves. This is a 
consequence of the age restriction - only respondents younger than 62. This age 
restriction is needed for P(62) and P(65) because these questions are not asked after that, 
and is also used for the expected claiming age to avoid dealing with the sample selection 
problem introduced by those who start claiming from age 62. Furthermore, because 
refreshments come into the sample in 1998 and 2004, any differences across cohorts that 
are not caused by the repeal, will show up in the aggregate time trend also. Fortunately, 
the longitudinal nature of our data allows us to control for such changes in the 




4. Calculation of Incentive Measures from the Earnings Test 
Since we can calculate social security benefits and potential loss due to the earnings 
test for respondents with a match, we can calculate various measures of social security 
wealth that involve the effect of the earnings test at the early retirement age (62) and the 
normal retirement age (65 or 66). We consider three such measures: 
 
A. Myopic loss: In the year where earnings are above the maximum allowed, the loss 
is given by 
 1max(min( [ ], ),0),   ,k k ke wh E P k ERA NRAτ= − =  (5) 
It is the loss in benefit that the worker incurs if he earns wh  at age k.  
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B. Forward-Looking Loss according to life-table survival Probabilities: This measure 
is the sum of the myopic loss and the gain arising from the actuarial adjustment 
compared to a situation where there is no earnings test,  
 1, , ,( ) ( )
A s k
L k k L k k k k ss k
f e S s Pθ π δ− +
=
= −∑  (6) 
where , ( )L kS s represents the life-table probability of living to age s given survival 
up to age k. The terminal age A is set such that , ( ) 0L kS A ≈  (here A=109). ,k sP  is 
the pension someone gets at age s from claiming at age k. 
 C. Forward-Looking Loss according to subjective survival probabilities: As 
discussed by Tran (2004), the actuarial adjustment may be fair for some but not 
for others who have lower life expectancy. This is particularly important in the 
case of the earnings test since individuals who are at the kink (the point where the 
earnings test kicks in), are likely to have lower socio-economic status and health 
than those high in the earnings distribution. One reason why the earnings test 
might have an effect on those workers is that the actuarial adjustment is relatively 
unfair for them. We also consider a forward-looking loss measure that takes 
account of the dispersion in survival probabilities in the population. Delavande 
and Rohwedder (2006) find that the heterogeneity in subjective probabilities 
proxies very closely the variation in true survival probabilities in the 
HRS/AHEAD panel. We therefore construct a set of probabilities , ( )j kS s for 
groups of respondents characterized by health, education, gender and age (see 
section 4.2 for details). Essentially, the life-table survival profile is adjusted for 
variation in subjective survival across these cells. The subjective loss is given by 
 1, , ( ) ( )
A s k
j k k j k k k ks k
f e S s Pθ π δ− +
=
= −∑ . (7) 
Note that (6) and (7) are not exactly correct in the case where we evaluate the loss 
at the early retirement age. In that case, the actuarial adjustment only kicks in 
once the worker reaches the NRA. One way to incorporate that is to define 
, ( )ERA s ERAI s NRAπ π= ≥  so that the actuarial adjustment in the earnings test 
operates only after the NRA. 
For forward looking measures, we use a real discount rate of 3% (i.e., 0.97θ = ). 




4.1 Calculation of Benefits 
We calculate the AIME of each respondent for each year in the survey as well as 
the projected AIME from ages 62 to 69. As for growth in future earnings, we use the 
growth in the Average National Wage Index. We take the last Social Security earnings in 
the SS.Er as the basis for computing each projection. This also assumes that the worker 
continues to work until the age at which we calculate the AIME. Hence, we adjust 
quarters of coverage accordingly so that an individual who is not eligible at age 55 but 
works until 62 could become eligible at age 62. In general workers are eligible if they 
accumulated more than 40 quarters of coverage (10 years where they accumulated 4 
credits from covered earnings). To calculate benefits, we use a formula constructed from 
the Social Security Handbook. We have done limited benchmark against the Social 
Security ANYPIA formula. Many parameters of the benefit formula are adjusted every 
year by SSA to reflect general changes in prices and cost-of-living. For years beyond 
2004, parameters of the formula such as bend points for computing the PIA, the exempt 
amount under the Earnings test, the maximum taxable earnings for Social Security are all 
updated using their average growth rate over the period 1985-2003. This is usually 
closely in line with the average national wage index. Hence, this implies that workers 
expect a change in those parameters which is consistent with previous recent changes to 
the benefit formula.  
In the formula, we do not implement dependent benefits. The earnings test 
become much more complicated for those receiving spouse benefits (their benefit 
depends on their as well as their spouse’s behavior). Hence, we calculate only benefits 
available under the respondent’s earnings record. This approximation is likely to be very 
close to actual benefits for men but perhaps different for females who draw spouse 
benefits. We take into account the minimum PIA in case the worker’s PIA is too low. 
Upon calculating the PIA, the benefit is adjusted for early or late claiming using the 
Actuarial Reduction factor (ARF before NRA) and the Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
that applies depending on the birth cohort. We implement the COLA adjustment which 
adjusts for inflation and cost-of-living increases. The average cost-of-living adjustment 
over the period 1985-2003 is used (2.9%). Finally, the earnings test is implemented using 
the rules in effect as outlined in Table 1.  
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4.2 Survival Probabilities 
 
Using life tables 
To operationalize our adjustment of life-table survival probabilities, we start from 
a simple exponential hazard model widely used to approximate survival curves, the 
Gompertz hazard. We assume that life table mortality rates follow the specification 
0, 1,( ) exp( )L L Lm a aκ κ= , where a is age and the parameters 0,Lκ  and 1,Lκ control the level 
and the slope of the log mortality rate. Using
0
( ) exp( ( ) )
a
L LS a m s ds= −∫ , the probability to 
survive until at least age a is given by 
 0,
1, 1,
( ) exp[ (1 exp( ))]L
LL L
S a aκκ κ= − . (8) 
Conditional on surviving up to age a, an individual has a probability to survive up 
to age s ( s a> ) given by , ( ) ( ) / ( )L a L LS s S s S a= . 
 
Using subjective probabilities 
The HRS asks age eligible respondents to report the probability they will survive 
up to age 75. Answers to such questions are known to include considerable measurement 
error, as well as focal responses (at 0, 50 and 100). Hence, estimation of individual 
survival curves is difficult (see Gan, Hurd and McFadden, 2003). We therefore prefer to 
estimate group level subjective survival curves. We define groups by age (2 year age 
categories), education level (less than 12 yrs, 12 yrs, more than 12 yrs) and health status 
(excellent /very good/good or fair/poor). We pool all waves (ignoring calendar time 
effects) and calculate the mean of the subjective probability responses within each age-
education-health cell. Hence, a respondent’s cell and reference subjective life-table can 
change over waves if the respondent changes group, e.g. due to deterioration of health or 
simply due to aging.  
In terms of the Gompertz model, the answers to the subjective probability 
question from age a to age 75 represent a point on the conditional subjective survival 
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We impose that the baseline hazard across all groups is the same as the baseline 
hazard of the life-table ( 1, 1,j Lκ κ= ).  This means we estimate the proportional change in 
the mortality hazard across groups but not the baseline hazard. The shape could be 
estimated using the probability question to age 85 or using the fact that the conditional 
survival curve is observed at different ages (from age 51 to 61). However, an analytical 
solution is difficult to obtain for the two parameters simultaneously.   
We can estimate 0, 1,,L Lκ κ  from the life table mortality rates. We do this separately 
for men and women and for each year in the survey, using the yearly life-tables available 
at www.mortality.org  (based on Vital Statistics). We regress 
0, 1,log( ( )) log( )L L Lm a a uκ κ= + +  where u is an error term. Define the log ratio of the 
conditional survival probabilities to age s from age a as 
 ,, 0, 0,
,
( )
( ) log[ ] ( ( ) ( ))[ ]
( )
j a
j a L L j L
L a
S s
r s D s D a
S s





1,( ) exp( (1 exp( )))LL LD x xκ κ= − . (11) 
 
This last term is “known” from estimation of the life-table parameters of the 
mortality hazard. 
The proportional constant for group j is then given by  
 ,0, 0,
( )









where ( ) log( ( ))L Ld x D x= . 
 The conditional subjective survival at each age for group j can be calculated from 
(9). These “corrections” adjust only for differences in the level of the log mortality 
hazard. Since this is probably the predominant difference in the underlying true hazard, 
this is likely to capture a considerable amount of differential mortality across groups.  
Table 6 reports the distribution of survival probabilities for 55 year old male and 
female respondents in 1992. The table shows that there is serious underprediction of 
survival probabilities to age 75, particularly for females (cf. Hurd and McGarry, 1995). 
For males, underprediction is rather small (3%), compared to 12% for females.  
 
 19
4.3 Incentive Measures: Is the Earnings Test a Tax? 
We first describe patterns of expected social security wealth assuming workers 
retire when they claim Social Security benefits. This helps understand the heterogeneity 
in the actuarial adjustment which workers face when they consider claiming benefits. We 
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Here ,k sP  is the annual social security benefit that we project the respondent could get at 
age s if starting to claim at age k . In addition to this measure, we compute an “accrual” 


















Similarly, we compute accrual rates ,j kA  using subjective mortality rates instead of life 
tables. If the accrual rate is zero, this means that the actuarial adjustment is perceived as 
fair from the point of view of the worker (given the assumptions on the survival 
probabilities and the discount rate). If it is negative, the worker loses in terms of expected 
social security wealth if he delays claiming. Because workers differ in terms of their 
potential benefits, earnings history, birth cohort (which determines many benefit rule 
parameters), and life expectancy (in the subjective case), there is considerable variation in 
the accruals.  
Table 7 presents Expected Social security wealth at age 62, the early retirement 
age, for the 10th, 25th, 50th (Median), 75th and 90th quantile of the sample of workers aged 
51-61. It also reports the ratios of these quantiles to the median and the distribution of 
accruals defined in equation (14). This is done using both life-table probabilities and the 
adjusted mortality probabilities in equation (9).  
Using life-table probabilities, median expected social security wealth at age 62 is 
$148,000. There is considerable variance, with the 10th quantile expecting $58,000 (0.39 
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times the median) and the 90th quantile expecting $228,000 (1.54 times the median). 
Hence, simply in terms of income effect, workers differ in their incentives to claim 
benefits as early as possible. The variance is larger when using subjective based survival 
rates. The median using subjective survival probabilities is lower ($147,000) which 
reflects higher pessimism in the subjective survival probabilities of workers, on average 
The ratio of the 10th and 90th quantile to the median (0.38 and 1.67 respectively) reflect 
somewhat higher variance than when using life-table probabilities, which can be 
explained by the heterogeneity in subjective survival probabilities.  
Social Security accruals are generally positive at the median until age 65 where 
for some workers, the DRC may not be sufficient to compensate for increased mortality 
risk. There is also considerable heterogeneity in accruals. For example, at age 65, half of 
the sample has a negative accrual while the other half has a positive accrual. Accruals 
tend to be lower in general using subjective probabilities because of higher aggregate 
mortality risk. But again the distribution is more dispersed than when using life-table 
accruals. At age 65, the 90th quantile faces a 2.47% accrual if he delays claiming to age 
66, compared to 2.0% when using the life-table.   
The median accrual decreases with age. It is interesting to note that the difference 
between subjective and life-table accruals is largest in the right tail of the distribution (i.e. 
for workers with high accruals). For these workers, life-table probabilities lead to 
considerable “overestimation” of the accrual, as revealed by their subjective probabilities 
of survival. The actuarial adjustment is at the center of the question as to whether the 
earnings test is a tax or not. Table 7 shows that this adjustment is likely to be perceived as 
unfair by a large fraction of the population around the normal retirement age.  
In Table 8, we compute the loss (or gain) due to the earnings test using the 
myopic loss ke , the forward-looking measure using life-table survival probabilities ,L kf  
and using subjective survival probabilities ,j kf . These losses are reported in dollars, as a 
fraction of earnings, and as a fraction of liquid financial assets (as a measure of liquidity 
constraints).  The myopic loss is larger at age 62 than at the NRA. This is due to a higher 
exempt amount at the NRA and a lower marginal tax rate. The heterogeneity in myopic 
tax rates is largely due to differences in projected earnings as well as differences in 
benefit entitlements.  
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Because of actuarial adjustments, the forward looking tax is much lower than the 
myopic rate. Of course, if the actuarial adjustment was perceived as completely fair, there 
would be no such tax. Additional heterogeneity is introduced when computing these 
forward-looking taxes. These now vary by birth cohort (due to different actuarial 
adjustment) and other differences entering the survival probabilities. The subjective 
forward-looking tax measure is somewhat higher for females than for males. This is 
because females underpredict their probability to live up to age 75.  
Since one interpretation why workers might prefer to claim and be subject to the 
earnings test is that they are liquidity constrained, we express these same taxes as a 
fraction of current liquid wealth. This shows that for most workers, the tax due to the 
earnings test is relatively small. But for a fraction of workers, the tax actually represents a 
large fraction of their liquid wealth  
Because actuarial adjustments and the normal retirement age change across 
cohorts, there is considerable heterogeneity in incentives across cohorts. Table 9 gives the 
median of the various tax variables by birth year. These numbers help understand why 
the earnings test will have different effects across different cohorts. For those born in 
1932, the forward-looking tax is much larger than for those born latter. This can be 
explained by the lower delayed retirement credit faced by those workers. For the workers 
that will be affected by the earnings test in 2000, born in 1935, the delayed retirement 
credit was 6.0% (see Table 1), leading to tax rates that are relatively low. 
The mean forward looking tax rate is very close to zero for younger workers. 
About 90% of workers in the age 51-61 sample face a tax lower than $5000 on life-time 
Social Security wealth. Expressed as a fraction of earnings or financial wealth, the tax 
imposed by the earnings test is therefore not large. Hence, if workers perceive the rules 
correctly, we should not expect them to react significantly to the repeal. This response is 
even less likely for workers born in latter cohorts, for whom the rate of actuarial 
adjustment is larger. 
 
5. The Effect of the Repeal on Expectations 
As explained in Section 2, workers with different expected loss due to the 
earnings test are predicted to react differently to the repeal. This is the case if workers are 
not aware of the actuarial adjustment compensating for benefits lost due to the earnings 
test, or, to a lesser extent, to workers who perceive the actuarial adjustment as actuarially 
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unfair. This suggests that we can use a difference-in-difference approach by grouping 
workers according to the pre-repeal incentives they faced as a consequence of the 
earnings test. The key to this identification strategy is the determination of the groups that 
get different treatments. We define the groups based on the percentage of social security 
benefits predicted to be lost at the normal retirement age (NRA).  
For example, those who were not expected to be affected by the repeal, i.e. had no 
loss due to the earnings test, are not likely to react to its repeal. This concerns everyone 
with earnings below the exempt amount. On the other hand, those who earn exactly the 
exempt amount or somewhat more should react to the repeal - it will increase the 
marginal return to working more hours, and we therefore expect them to get a higher 
probability to work full-time past age 65. For the group who earn substantially more than 
the exempt for whom a high share of their benefit but not everything is taxed away, the 
same substitution effect applies, but this is more likely to be compensated by an income 
effect: eliminating the earnings test will not only change their marginal wage but also 
bring them to a higher indifference curve. This effect will become larger the higher the 
amount of benefit which was lost under the earnings test. Hence, for the group that has a 
substantial fraction taxed away, the total effect is unknown. Finally, for the group for 
whom all benefits are taxed away under the earnings test, there will be no substitution 
effect but only a (probably negative) income effect, and one would expect a negative 
effect of eliminating the earnings test on the probability to work past 65. 
We thus define groups in the following way: 
 
1. No benefit lost: Projected earnings below 80% of the exempt amount, 
2. 1% to 49% of benefit lost 
3. 50% to 99% of benefit lost 
4. 100% of benefit lost 
 
Denote by , 1, 2,3,4cg c = ,  the indicators that take value 1 when the respondent is in one 
of these four groups. We use 1998 as the year to define the grouping since it is the wave 
preceding the repeal. Define a variable tREP  that takes value 1 for observations after the 
repeal in 2000. Since job characteristics are only observed from 1996 onwards, and we 
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cannot use the cohort of “Early boomers” in 2004, and we are left with the time widow 
1996-2002.  
 We first consider the respondents who report a non-missing expectation in waves 
1998 and 2002. The idea is to look for a differential change between the two waves 
across groups. Composition effects cannot occur because we consider the same 
respondents in both waves. The identifying assumption is that all groups would have 
similar trends in expectations if there were no repeal. Table 10 reports mean expectations 
in both waves for each group, separately for males (left hand panel) and females (right 
hand panel). 
 For males, the results for P(65), the probability to work full-time at any point in 
time after reaching age 65, are in line with what the theory discussed above predicts. 
Respondents for whom the earnings test was not binding (group 1) hardly change their 
average P(65), and the fraction with nonzero P(65) does not change much either. This 
suggests that there is not much of a trend in P(65). For group 2, the group for which we 
predicted the largest positive effect, we indeed find a substantial increase in the average 
value of the probability to work full-time after the normal retirement age of 65 years, and 
we also find a substantial increase in the fraction reporting that this probability is 
nonzero. Taking group 1 as the control group (the group with no treatment), the 
difference in differences estimators are 2.98%-points for the increase in the average P(65) 
and 7.75%-points for the increase in the percentage of male workers with nonzero P(65). 
For group 3, we find positive but smaller effects, in line with theory – here the positive 
substitution effect is partly cancelled by a negative income effect. Finally, for group 4, 
we do not find much of an effect. We would have expected to find a negative income 
effect here, but their change in P(65) is actually somewhat larger than that for the control 
group instead of smaller. For these workers, Social Security benefits may actually 
represent a small share of their total wealth. 
 For female workers, the effects are quite different. All groups have positive 
changes, including the control group, suggesting a positive trend in the probability to 
work full-time past age 65 for these cohorts. The three groups that are affected by the 
earnings test (and its elimination) all show larger positive effects than the control group, 
implying that elimination of the earnings test will have a positive effect on labor supply. 
In contrast to the theoretical prediction and the results for men, however, the effect is 
small for group 2 and larger for groups 3 and 4. An explanation may be that for women, 
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spouse benefits play a large role, and their importance will correlate with their own group 
assignment (because of joint features in earnings capacity and labor supply of couples). 
Spouse benefits are not accounted for in our analysis. We therefore do not want to make 
much of the results for females. 
 In the bottom panel of Table 10, we consider the expected age at which 
respondents think they will start claiming old age social security benefits. If people would 
think they are heavily taxed by the earnings test (ignoring or downgrading the 
compensation in the form of actuarial adjustment), but would realize that claiming later 
leads to higher benefits, we would expect that abolishing the earnings test has positive 
effects on the probability to claim at (or before) the normal retirement age. These effects 
should be largest for the people who are taxed most, i.e., for groups 3 and 4. On the other 
hand, if labor supply increases due to elimination of the earnings test, people will be less 
in need of immediate benefits and will tend to postpone claiming. This gives a negative 
effect on the probability to claim at NRA, particularly for group 2 and to a lesser extent 
for group 3. The results show that for all groups the probability to postpone claiming till 
after NRA rises over time, but the change is largest for group 1, the group that is 
unaffected by the earnings test. Thus abolishing the earnings test seems to make people 
claim earlier, in line with the first effect discussed above – their earnings are no longer 
taxed away. The differences between the three groups, however, are not in line with the 
theoretical arguments, neither for men nor for women. 
 An alternative interpretation would be that many workers also do not understand 
the negative consequences of early claiming for their future benefits level. Many workers 
will simply anticipate that they will start claiming when they stop working. Again, 
however, this is not in line with the results – we would then expect the largest positive 
effect on the probability to postpone claiming for group 2, the group with the largest 
positive effect on labor supply after NRA.    
 The difference in differences estimator only consider the balanced sample of 
individuals who work and answer the expectations questions both in 1998 and 2002. In 
order to exploit the complete unbalanced sample, we formulate a model that also controls 
for several background characteristics.  
 We observe for each individual i in wave 1,..., it T= , the subjective probability to 
work past age 65, itp , and the age at which respondents expect to claim benefits ite . We 
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model itp with a two-limit tobit equation, accounting for the substantial number of zeros 
and 100 in the observed answers:  
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 We consider two specifications, one where the itu are assumed to be independent 
over time (pooled tobit) and one where the itu are equi-correlated, i.e., are the sum of an 
error term which is assumed to be independent over time, and an individual effect which 
remains the same over time. 
 We include dummies for three of the four groups to capture differences between 
groups that remain constant over time, and time dummies to capture the trend relevant for 
all groups. (These variables were also included in the model which implicitly was behind 
the difference in difference estimates presented in Table 10). We also incorporate a 
number of background characteristics, some constant over time (race and education), 
others time varying (health, job characteristics, pension entitlements, household wealth).   
The left hand panels of Tables 11a and 11b report the estimates of the parameters 
of main interest, the interactions ( cξ ) which measure the differential effect of elimination 
of the earnings test for each of the four groups. The complete two-limit tobit results (and 
the details on which background variables are included) are presented in the appendix. 
 There are some differences in size of coefficients between the two columns, but 
qualitative conclusions are largely similar. The findings for men are largely in line with 
the difference in differences estimates in Table 10. We find results in accordance with 
theory – the largest positive effects of eliminating the earnings test are found for those 
whose marginal wage increases, a positive substitution effect. Unlike in Table 10, 
however, there is no evidence that an income effect in the opposite direction would 
reduce the total change for those with a substantial income gain (group 3). The estimated 
effect for group 3 is actually somewhat larger than that for group 2, though not 
significantly so. Evidence of an income effect is also not apparent from group 4 – its 
reaction to the elimination is not significantly different from that of the control group.  
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 For women, the sign and ordering of the effects are in line with theory, with group 
2 having the largest positive (substitution) effect, a smaller positive effect for group 3, 
and a negative (income) effect for group 4. None of these effects are significant, 
however. 
 In column 3, we consider the binary event whether a worker reports a positive or a 
zero probability to work full-time after age 65. A random effects probit model is used, 
with a specification that is otherwise the same as the random effects tobit model in the 
second column. The results for men are more in line with the theory than those for the 
tobit models, in the sense that group 2 now is affected most by elimination of the 
earnings test. The effect for group 3 is positive also, but smaller and not significant. For 
women, the results are qualitatively similar to those for the tobit models. The effects have 
the sign and ranking predicted by theory, but none of them is significant. 
 We also considered P(62), the probability of working past age 62. We have 
estimated the same models for this as for P(65), but found that the repeal of the earnings 
test had a small and insignificant effect for all groups. See the Appendix for the results. 
This is understandable – although there are reasons why there could be indirect labor 
supply effects of the earnings test on P(62), the effects are likely to be smaller than those 
on P(65) where within period is immediately affected. The fact that we do not find 
evidence of these effects could be seen as evidence against intertemporal substitution or 
life-cycle optimization, but it could also just mean that these indirect effects are too small 
to be significant in the available sample.  
 Columns 4 and 5 of Tables 11a and 11b present the estimates of the effect of 
elimination of the earnings test on the expected claiming age. Column 4 presents the 
results of a random effects ordered probit model, distinguishing three cases: claiming 
before NRA, claiming at NRA, or claiming after NRA. A positive coefficient indicates 
that the probability to claim before NRA falls while the probability to claim after NRA 
rises (the effect on claiming at NRA is ambiguous). In column 5, no distinction is made 
between claiming before or at the normal retirement age, and a random effects probit 
model is estimated. The right hand sides of the ordered probit and probit models are 
specified in the same way as in the models for P(65).    
 In line with the results in Table 10, the parameter estimates are small, and we do 
not find significant effects on the expected claiming age. Only if the three groups that are 
affected by the earnings test are merged (top panel of the table), we find marginally 
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significant effect for men and a significant effect in the ordered probit for women, but the 
signs of the effects are opposite in the ordered probit and the probit model.  
 
 
6. Deviations from Expectations 
In the previous section we found that the repeal of the earnings test after NRA has 
had an effect on the probability that male respondents will work after age 65, but we 
found no evidence on an effect on the expected claiming age. One possible explanation 
for the latter might be that respondents report their most likely retirement age and the 
effect of the repeal may not be large enough to change this, even though the repeal does 
have an effect on the probability distribution. In this sense, the expected claiming age is 
not so informative. In this section we look at the realized claiming age, which does not 
suffer from the same problem – it is a realization, not a forecast. We consider two 
indicators of actual claiming decisions: whether someone claims when reaching NRA (or 
earlier), and the difference between the age when someone starts claiming and the last 
available forecast (given at age 61 or earlier).   
 For the actual decisions when respondents start claiming Social Security benefits, 
we select the survey years 1998 and 2000 and look at respondents who reach NRA 
between these two waves, who have not yet claimed Social Security benefits in 1998, and 
who will eventually claim prior to age 70.10  
Table 12 presents the results. The number of respondents who claim immediately 
after reaching NRA increases with the repeal of the earnings test. The increase is 
substantial for men (13.7%-points), and smaller for women (3.7%-points). On the other 
hand, as we saw earlier, the expected claiming age does not show the same reaction to the 
repeal. As a consequence, we find that the average difference between actual and 
expected claiming age has become negative in 2000, while it was almost zero in 1998, for 
both men and women. 
 The bottom panel distinguishes the same four groups as before, on the basis of 
how much their earnings are taxed while the earnings test is still in place. Men and 
                                                 
10 For those reaching the NRA in 2000, we observe whether they claim at age 69 or earlier in  the 2004 
wave. Hence, to avoid problems of right-censoring, we select the sample of those who will actually claim 
between 65 and 69 years old. We consider 2000 rather than the 2002 interview because of this censoring 
issue. In 1996, very few respondents have reached the NRA. Only the oldest of the original cohort (age 61 
in 1992). This is why we start in 1998. 
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women have been merged to increase sample size. Still, sample size is quite small and the 
results should be interpreted with some care – differences are not statistically significant 
at the usual levels. Still, the results suggest that particularly those who were most affected 
by the earnings test decide to claim earlier after the earnings test is repealed. The groups 
with tax rates higher than 50% are the groups for which the difference between actual and 
expected claiming age is less (i.e., less positive or more negative) in 2000 than in 1998. 
The increase in the fraction of people claiming immediately after NRA is largest for the 
group with the highest tax on their SS benefits under the earnings test (27%-points), and 
the differences are also positive but smaller for the other groups who are taxed. 
 While suffering from small sample size, all these results thus point in the same 
direction: the repeal of the earnings has induced a change in actual claiming behavior that 
is in line with economic theory – more people claim immediately upon reaching NRA, 
because their benefits are no longer taxed by the earnings test. This leaves us with the 
question why we do not find an effect on expected claiming age, while the results for 
P(65) suggest that (male) respondents do adjust their expected labor supply behavior. A 
possible answer is that the expected claiming age provides incomplete information on the 
respondents’ subjective probability distribution. It may well reflect the most likely 
outcome only, and probabilities may change without changing this most likely outcome.   
       
 
7. Conclusions 
 The elimination of the earnings test on social security benefits after the normal 
retirement age has been used as a natural experiment in various studies on actual labor 
supply at an older age. In this study, we have focused on how this policy changes affects 
expectations of workers who have not yet reached an age at which they can claim old age 
social security benefits. We have presented a two period theoretical model, demonstrating 
that workers should react in different ways, depending on where they are on their budget 
set while the earnings test is still in place. This model also implies that the effects are 
smaller if workers realize that taxed away benefits will be returned in later years with 
actuarial adjustment. In that case, depending on the individual’s discount factor and the 
actuarial adjustment rate, it may even be the case that the earnings test is irrelevant. 
 The advantage of looking at expectations is that we can see how expectations of 
the same people develop over time. Moreover, since some groups were not affected by 
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the earnings test in the first place, a control group is available. Administrative social 
security records linked to the core HRS data allow us to distinguish the control group and 
several treatment groups in our data. Combining this with the time dimension allows for a 
difference in differences approach. We applied this both to the self-reported probability 
of working full-time after age 65 (the normal retirement age during the time period we 
consider), and to the self-reported expected claiming age. 
 For men, we find substantial effects of elimination of the earnings test that on the 
probability to work after the normal retirement age, and the qualitative effects are in line 
with the theoretical predictions under the assumption that people do not realize that 
benefits taxed away by the earnings test are returned later with actuarial adjustment, or 
under the assumption that people have large discount rates or face liquidity constraints so 
that they hardly account for the future consequences of their current decisions. For 
women, no clear effects of elimination of the earnings test are found, probably due to the 
relation between the effect of the earnings test on own benefits and changes in spousal 
benefits, relevant to a large fraction of women in the sample. The issue of spouse benefits 
is not dealt with in the current paper and is an issue of further research. 
 Neither for men, nor for women, significant effects on the expected claiming age 
are found. This is puzzling, since theoretical arguments would predict that effects on 
labor supply and retirement would be accompanied by changes in the expected claiming 
age. It casts some doubt on whether people choose their (expected) claiming age based on 
the economic trade-off between leisure and income. This is also an issue for further 
research. 
 The conclusion that people adjust their future work and retirement plans to the 
rules of the social security system is important for public policy. It also implies that 
people realize that the rules change, giving them at least a chance to reconsider their 
retirement savings and investment portfolio. On the other hand, the result that the 
adjustment of plans is largely based on misperception of the rules, ignoring the actuarial 
adjusted compensation in later years for benefits lost under the earnings test, is also 
relevant. It confirms that many people do not always base their expectations and 
decisions on fully rational economic optimization and suggests that providing 
information and keeping the rules simple and transparent is as important in formulating 
policy measures as incorporating the desired financial incentives.          
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Table 1 Parameters of the Earnings Test and Actuarial Adjustment 1992-2004 
for those reaching the NRA in 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
NRA 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 4mo
7,440 8,040 8,280 9,120 10,080 11,280 11,640 
10,200 11,160 12,500 14,500 None None None
50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
33% 33% 33% 33% 0% 0% 0%
6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8% 6.8%
4.0% 4.5% 5.0% 5.5% 6.0% 6.5% 7.0%
Actuarial Reduction Factor (before 
NRA)
Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) 
(after NRA)
Notes: Earnings limit defined in rule §1803.2 of the Social Security Handbook 2004. Normal retirement age defined in §723.5. 
Delayed retirement credit §720.3. §724.1 defines the actuarial reduction factor.
Earnings Limit before NRA





Table 2 HRS design  
Birth year DRC NRA 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 HRS cohort
1918 3.50% 65 74 76 78 80 82 84 86
1919 3.50% 65 73 75 77 79 81 83 85
1920 3.50% 65 72 74 76 78 80 82 84
1921 3.50% 65 71 73 75 77 79 81 83
1922 3.50% 65 70 72 74 76 78 80 82
1923 3.50% 65 69 71 73 75 77 79 81
1924 3.50% 65 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
1925 3.50% 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79
1926 3.50% 65 66 68 70 72 74 76 78
1927 4.00% 65 65 67 69 71 73 75 77
1928 4.00% 65 64 66 68 70 72 74 76
1929 4.50% 65 63 65 67 69 71 73 75
1930 4.50% 65 62 64 66 68 70 72 74
1931 5.00% 65 61 63 65 67 69 71 73
1932 5.00% 65 60 62 64 66 68 70 72
1933 5.50% 65 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
1934 5.50% 65 58 60 62 64 66 68 70
1935 6.00% 65 57 59 61 63 65 67 69
1936 6.00% 65 56 58 60 62 64 66 68
1937 6.50% 65 55 57 59 61 63 65 67
1938 6.50% 65.02 54 56 58 60 62 64 66
1939 7.00% 65.04 53 55 57 59 61 63 65
1940 7.00% 65.06 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
1941 7.50% 65.08 51 53 55 57 59 61 63
1942 7.50% 66 50 52 54 56 58 60 62
1943 8.00% 66 49 51 53 55 57 59 61
1944 8.00% 66 48 50 52 54 56 58 60
1945 8.00% 66 47 49 51 53 55 57 59
1946 8.00% 66 46 48 50 52 54 56 58
1947 8.00% 66 45 47 49 51 53 55 57
1948 8.00% 66 44 46 48 50 52 54 56
1949 8.00% 66 43 45 47 49 51 53 55
1950 8.00% 66 42 44 46 48 50 52 54
1951 8.00% 66 41 43 45 47 49 51 53
1951 8.00% 66 41 43 45 47 49 51 52
1952 8.00% 66 40 42 44 46 48 50 51











Table 3: Sample of Workers aged 51-61 
age
all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er all SS.Er
50 378 293 146 115 104 74 233 139 106 62 48 24 235 27
51 708 555 212 169 109 72 418 234 136 69 56 30 408 23
52 685 500 393 306 136 102 343 197 261 142 103 54 483 29
53 704 520 641 500 199 163 346 201 400 227 119 56 417 25
54 622 466 600 456 373 286 359 227 293 173 215 115 395 50
55 628 470 605 463 555 426 417 279 297 185 374 214 404 59
56 592 439 532 411 540 409 532 369 325 207 267 160 352 106
57 584 444 497 393 570 438 562 431 380 245 282 161 347 203
58 524 390 528 402 474 375 487 365 442 334 280 167 254 142
59 484 375 500 392 480 378 507 391 490 374 320 216 250 151
60 486 372 415 310 453 334 448 337 425 319 380 267 273 166
61 350 269 374 299 422 331 411 311 418 321 423 329 277 187
Total 6,745 5,093 5,443 4,216 4,415 3,388 5,063 3,481 3,973 2,658 2,867 1,793 4,095 1,168




Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Sample Age 51-61 
 
All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er All SS.Er
demographics (Mean)
age 55.9 55.9 56.7 56.8 56.0 56.3 56.5 56.9 57.1 57.5 55.1 57.6
widow 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06
sep(or)div 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.11
never married 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
black 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.11
other race 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.03
school yrs 12.6 12.6 12.7 12.7 13.0 13.0 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.4
health good 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33
health fair/poor 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.14
Job Characteristics (Mean)
self-employed 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17
tenure (yrs) 13.6 13.5 13.3 13.2 13.5 13.3 13.5 13.5 13.2 13.3 12.7 12.9
pressured to retire <65 
by co-workers
0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
transition low 
demanding job easy
0.00 0.00 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.29
total fin. wealth 144,621 141,863 145,532 144,943 141,131 140,550 153,932 154,482 159,973 154,710 161,000 170,500
liquid fin. wealth 19,169 19,164 18,704 18,885 18,585 17,424 24,739 26,388 28,416 26,311 14,000 22,000
Total HH Income 58,257 58,768 62,267 61,785 63,886 63,422 66,230 65,784 66,856 65,252 68,024 64,760
Current AIME 2,018 2,045 2,273 2,367 2,370 2,304
% with pension plan 0.567 0.575 0.569 0.575 0.587 0.594 0.611 0.620 0.590 0.592 0.590 0.588
% with DC Plan 0.270 0.281 0.305 0.314 0.361 0.366 0.360 0.369 0.359 0.366 0.411 0.388
% with DB Plan 0.370 0.373 0.343 0.344 0.338 0.343 0.330 0.336 0.314 0.311 0.296 0.312
2004
Notes: Variable definitions in Appendix . All statistics are unweighted. Dollar amounts converted to $2004 using the BLS consumer 
price index.
Median wealth and earnings (USD 2004)
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
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age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 27.26 26.88 24.81 30.16 31.24 29.43
0.52 0.59 0.55 0.64 0.69 0.71
55-57 31.96 26.13 27.63 29.62 32.36 28.94
0.56 0.56 0.55 0.60 0.68 0.68
58-61 30.01 29.13 30.77 29.04 32.11 32.51
0.54 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.66
Total 29.32 27.45 28.79 29.50 31.98 31.20
0.53 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.64 0.67
mean and %>66
age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 63.46 63.45 63.64 63.83 64.41 64.26
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.09
55-57 63.42 63.38 63.55 63.86 63.82 64.14
0.04 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.11
58-61 63.65 63.46 63.72 63.64 63.70 64.00
0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11
Total 63.50 63.43 63.64 63.76 63.87 64.07
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11
Notes: mean (including zeros) and % larger than 0 for each year and age 
group. Workers aged 51-61.
Age Expect to Claim Social Security Benefits by year




age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 22.14 19.78 20.80 23.21 24.86 22.91
0.46 0.49 0.47 0.54 0.57 0.59
55-57 20.51 20.91 25.78 22.82 25.69 27.35
0.42 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.62
58-61 22.65 20.92 23.35 23.88 28.75 28.02
0.43 0.44 0.45 0.50 0.59 0.58
Total 21.85 20.45 23.41 23.33 26.78 26.77
0.443 0.469 0.477 0.516 0.573 0.596
mean and %>66
age 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
51-54 63.41 63.44 63.69 63.83 64.09 64.18
0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.15
55-57 63.45 63.35 63.74 63.71 63.65 64.34
0.03 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.14
58-61 63.61 63.56 63.69 63.72 63.94 63.69
0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07
Total 63.47 63.45 63.71 63.75 63.91 64.00
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11
probability work at 65 by year 
Age Expect to Claim Social Security Benefits by year
Notes: mean (including zeros) and % larger than 0 for each year and age 




Table 6: Survival Probabilities based on Life-Tables and Subjective Probabilities 
Conditional on Surviving to Age 55 
age life-table subjective Std. Min Max
Males
55 1 1 0 1 1
56 0.991 0.987 0.005 0.978 0.991
57 0.980 0.974 0.009 0.954 0.981
58 0.969 0.960 0.014 0.930 0.971
59 0.957 0.945 0.019 0.904 0.960
60 0.944 0.929 0.024 0.878 0.948
65 0.862 0.838 0.052 0.729 0.879
75 0.610 0.590 0.102 0.381 0.675
85 0.271 0.299 0.102 0.101 0.393
95 0.037 0.082 0.044 0.007 0.130
105 0.001 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.014
109 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
Females
55 1 1 0 1 1
56 0.995 0.990 0.003 0.982 0.993
57 0.989 0.979 0.007 0.964 0.985
58 0.982 0.967 0.011 0.944 0.977
59 0.975 0.955 0.015 0.923 0.968
60 0.967 0.942 0.019 0.901 0.958
65 0.918 0.863 0.042 0.774 0.900
75 0.751 0.633 0.091 0.444 0.717
85 0.457 0.334 0.102 0.134 0.438
95 0.111 0.092 0.048 0.010 0.151
105 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.015
109 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003







Table 7a: Expected Social Security Wealth and Incentives to Claim Social Security 
Benefits for those aged 51-61 from 1992 to 2004: Males 
using life-table mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 90,157 0.503 0.42 -0.39 -1.13 -2.55 -3.09 -3.58 -4.07
25th 135,609 0.757 0.72 -0.09 -0.83 -1.71 -2.34 -2.91 -3.48
Median 179,091 1.000 1.32 0.48 -0.30 -1.03 -1.65 -2.27 -2.88
75th 213,326 1.191 1.81 0.91 0.10 -0.46 -0.77 -1.52 -2.21
90th 233,987 1.307 2.59 1.64 0.80 0.11 0.06 -0.72 -1.46
using subjective mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 87,043 0.485 -0.04 -0.99 -1.86 -3.01 -3.45 -4.04 -4.64
25th 129,972 0.724 0.81 0.01 -0.70 -1.76 -2.27 -2.78 -3.28
Median 179,536 1.000 1.47 0.65 -0.09 -0.79 -1.33 -1.90 -2.45
75th 219,491 1.223 2.09 1.27 0.54 -0.10 -0.40 -1.06 -1.65
90th 245,663 1.368 2.85 1.95 1.16 0.57 0.39 -0.31 -0.97
accrual (% of W62)
accrual (% of W62)
Notes: median social security wealth at 62 for the sample aged 51-61 between 1992 and 2004. 
Expressed in $2004 USD. The accrual at age a is defined in terms of the % difference between 
the expected present value of social security wealth if claimed at a +1 compared to age a . 
 
Table 7b: Expected Social Security Wealth and Incentives to Claim Social Secutity 
Benefits for those aged 51-61 from 1992 to 2004: Females 
using life-table mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 37,432 0.209 1.65 0.87 0.18 -0.34 -0.96 -1.54 -2.05
25th 85,422 0.477 2.52 1.67 0.93 0.21 -0.16 -0.75 -1.31
Median 119,872 0.669 3.55 2.67 1.88 1.09 0.83 0.17 -0.46
75th 162,557 0.908 4.53 3.66 2.88 2.15 1.83 1.12 0.45
90th 213,007 1.189 5.82 4.91 4.07 3.35 3.22 2.47 1.84
using subjective mortality rates
SS relative to 
quantile wealth 62 median 62 63 64 65 66 67 68
10th 33,575 0.187 0.89 0.02 -0.74 -1.77 -2.25 -2.83 -3.45
25th 74,172 0.413 1.73 0.88 0.13 -0.59 -1.06 -1.68 -2.26
Median 108,499 0.604 2.84 1.95 1.15 0.42 0.16 -0.51 -1.14
75th 150,337 0.837 4.00 3.12 2.33 1.57 1.31 0.58 -0.08
90th 201,923 1.125 5.28 4.36 3.56 2.88 2.69 1.97 1.33
accrual (% of W62)
accrual (% of W62)
Notes: median social security wealth at 62 for the sample aged 51-61 between 1992 and 2004. 
Expressed in $2004 USD. The accrual at age a is defined in terms of the % difference between 
the expected present value of social security wealth if claimed at a +1 compared to age a . 
 
 37
Table 8a: Projected Loss from the Earnings Test before 2000: Males 
 
quantile myopic life-table subjective myopic life-table subjective
Loss in dollars
10th 0 0 0 0 0 0
25th 3,003 868 832 0 0 0
50th 12,020 3,485 3,010 6,913 1,549 1,114
75th 15,300 4,387 3,698 15,486 3,473 2,785
90th 16,856 4,758 4,336 21,201 5,451 4,727
as fraction of earnings (positive earnings)
10th 0 0 0 0 0 0
25th 0.193 0.055 0.043 0.091 0.016 0.005
50th 0.239 0.069 0.059 0.191 0.039 0.030
75th 0.292 0.084 0.080 0.233 0.062 0.055
90th 0.327 0.095 0.098 0.251 0.077 0.075
as fraction of current liquid assets (positive assets)
10th -0.571 -0.162 -0.159 -0.289 -0.064 -0.052
25th 0 0 0 0 0 0
50th 0.087 0.025 0.021 0.057 0.013 0.008
75th 0.439 0.127 0.115 0.310 0.075 0.059
90th 2.128 0.603 0.555 1.404 0.347 0.292
forward-looking using forward-looking using
Notes: workers aged 51-61 interviewed before 2000. 
Predicted Loss due to the earnings test
age 62 normal retirement age
 
 
Table 8b: Projected Loss from the Earnings Test before 2000: Females 
quantile myopic life-table subjective myopic life-table subjective
Loss in dollars
10th 0 0 0 0 -174 0
25th 0 0 0 0 0 0
50th 4,852 727 1,095 575 0 0
75th 9,463 1,413 2,067 5,811 448 750
90th 12,882 1,895 2,720 11,730 1,311 1,940
as fraction of earnings (positive earnings)
10th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 -0.007 -0.001
25th 0.077 0.009 0.018 0 0 0
50th 0.216 0.031 0.041 0.076 0 0.002
75th 0.264 0.039 0.060 0.170 0.017 0.026
90th 0.294 0.045 0.077 0.217 0.035 0.049
as fraction of current liquid assets (positive assets)
10th -0.318 -0.047 -0.076 -0.01061 -0.01384 -0.0127036
25th 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0 0
50th 0.022 0.003 0.005 0 0 0
75th 0.240 0.035 0.052 0.100528 0.007395 0.0118125
90th 1.338 0.195 0.320 0.612906 0.062906 0.0946192
Predicted Loss due to the earnings test
Notes: workers aged 51-61 interviewed before 2000. 
age 62 normal retirement age
forward-looking using forward-looking using
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Table 9: Earnings Test Incentives by Birth Cohort 
mean % of earnings at
birth year NRA DRC moypic life-table subjective myopic life-table subjective
1932 65 0.050 0.188 0.047 0.052 0.130 0.056 0.056
1933 65 0.055 0.191 0.045 0.055 0.115 0.040 0.042
1934 65 0.055 0.200 0.049 0.057 0.128 0.043 0.045
1935 65 0.060 0.206 0.050 0.057 0.133 0.038 0.039
1936 65 0.060 0.203 0.047 0.055 0.131 0.037 0.039
1937 65 0.065 0.205 0.045 0.053 0.127 0.028 0.029
1938 65.02 0.065 0.199 0.044 0.050 0.127 0.028 0.028
1939 65.04 0.070 0.208 0.047 0.052 0.125 0.019 0.019
1940 65.06 0.070 0.206 0.046 0.048 0.124 0.018 0.017
1941 65.08 0.075 0.203 0.043 0.046 0.129 0.011 0.008
1942 66 0.075 0.185 0.031 0.038 0.092 0.005 0.006
1943 66 0.080 0.179 0.041 0.047 0.087 0.001 0.002
1944 66 0.080 0.191 0.043 0.051 0.099 0.001 0.003
1945 66 0.080 0.196 0.045 0.051 0.098 0.002 0.003
1946 66 0.080 0.194 0.046 0.050 0.110 0.003 0.002
1947 66 0.080 0.198 0.047 0.055 0.108 0.005 0.005
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 between 1992 and 1998.
forward-looking






Table 10: Unconditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates  
Myopic loss
% of benefit at NRA
Group 1998 2002 Diff 2002-1998 1998 2002 Diff 2002-1998
0 36.30 36.08 -0.22 25.57 27.49 1.92
1 to 49% 34.48 37.24 2.76 24.88 27.34 2.46
50 to 99% 26.26 27.40 1.14 25.06 29.13 4.07
100% 31.32 31.58 0.26 35.59 42.35 6.76
Group
0 65.91 65.15 -0.76 53.36 55.37 2.01
1 to 49% 65.50 72.49 6.99 57.91 61.39 3.49
50 to 99% 67.46 68.25 0.79 56.15 65.24 9.09
100% 73.68 73.68 0.00 64.71 70.59 5.88
Group
0 8.20 13.11 4.92 6.59 9.52 2.93
1 to 49% 7.02 7.46 0.44 6.61 7.76 1.15
50 to 99% 7.93 9.66 1.72 11.70 13.83 2.13
100% 12.90 16.13 3.23 25.00 15.00 -10.00
FemalesMales
%EC>NRA (N=829)
 Males:  mean P65 (N=875)
% P65>0 (N=875)
 mean P65 (N=632)
% P65>0 (N=632)
%EC>NRA (N=671)





Table 11a: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates for Males 








repeal (REP=1) 1.963 1.253 0.114 -0.161 0.383
Control is no tax (0.640) (0.632) (0.437) (0.098) (0.049)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 9.927 5.944 0.448 0.047 -0.090
(0.053) (0.058) (0.010) (0.688) (0.698)
51-99% of P 10.388 7.505 0.229 0.113 0.217
(0.040) (0.015) (0.169) (0.329) (0.342)
100% if P -4.431 3.033 0.018 -0.059 -0.375
(0.638) (0.601) (0.954) (0.768) (0.314)
N 4146 4146 4146 3791 3791
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective
probability to work full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security
Benefits. REP is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for 2000 and 2002 observations. The grouping is done by the
share of benefits loss at NRA. Controls for age dummies, demographics, job characteristics, current financial
resources and projected social security wealth and accrual at age 62 as well as AIME. Full results in Appendix.
 
Table 11b: Conditional Difference-in-Difference Grouping Estimates for Females 








repeal (REP=1) 8.225 4.630 0.326 -0.291 0.195
Control is no tax (0.007) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.171)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 1.810 2.394 0.127 0.126 0.101
(0.644) (0.360) (0.264) (0.167) (0.571)
51-99% of P 0.458 1.956 0.066 0.074 -0.171
(0.925) (0.550) (0.647) (0.496) (0.388)
100% if P -6.206 -2.709 -0.365 -0.225 -0.164
(0.617) (0.736) (0.339) (0.396) (0.702)
N 5306 5306 5306 4363 4363
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective
probability to work full-time past 65. EC represents the age at which the respondent expects to claim Social Security
Benefits. REP is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for 2000 and 2002 observations. The grouping is done by the
share of benefits loss at NRA. Controls for age dummies, demographics, job characteristics, current financial
resources and projected social security wealth and accrual at age 62 as well as AIME. Full results in Appendix.
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Table 12 Actual Claiming Decisions and Differences between Actual and Expected 
Claiming Age 
mean deviation Diff Diff
N 1998 2000 2000-1998 1998 2000 2000-1998
gender
female 0.086 -0.451 -0.537 0.800 0.837 0.037
70 73 70 73
male 0.430 -0.433 -0.863 0.701 0.832 0.131
93 90 93 90
fraction benefit loss 





0 -0.200 -0.154 0.046 0.862 0.862 0.000
35 39 35 39
1-50% -0.222 -0.225 -0.003 0.781 0.880 0.099
45 40 45 40
51-99% 0.487 0.029 -0.458 0.712 0.795 0.084
39 35 39 35
100% -0.222 -0.779 -0.557 0.571 0.840 0.269
18 18 18 18
turning 65 in turning 65 in
Deviation claim at NRA
Notes: sample of respondents who turn 65 in given wave, have not claimed before 65 and will not claim after age 69 (for deviations). 
The variable in the deviation is the difference between the age at which benefits were claimed and the age at which the respondent 




Appendix: Complete Results (in order Males and Females) 








widow -7.776 -7.046 -0.373 0.039 0.515
(ref: married) 0.283 0.173 0.190 0.807 0.099
divorced -1.325 0.749 0.076 -0.013 0.026
0.673 0.741 0.589 0.856 0.872
never married 3.236 2.186 0.381 0.034 0.124
0.590 0.595 0.205 0.792 0.677
black -13.204 -10.960 -0.646 -0.313 -0.338
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093
other race 6.348 3.513 -0.156 0.147 0.257
0.216 0.377 0.538 0.202 0.327
years schooling 2.018 1.187 0.069 0.046 0.125
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
health good -8.429 -5.450 -0.189 -0.090 -0.096
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.052 0.354
health fair/poor -4.853 -0.579 -0.004 0.064 -0.040
0.240 0.844 0.984 0.550 0.859
self-employed 30.210 20.014 0.793 0.113 0.389
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.004
tenure current job -0.265 -0.240 -0.014 -0.003 -0.009
0.002 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.047
pressure to retire -5.316 -4.501 -0.255 -0.195 -0.037
< 65 from co-workers 0.070 0.024 0.014 0.004 0.810
transition less 5.463 2.041 0.105 0.035 0.183
demanding job poss. 0.012 0.152 0.180 0.465 0.080
1st quntile wealth 17.377 13.610 0.394 0.266 0.366
0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.024
2nd quntile wealth 6.348 5.738 0.083 0.058 0.082
(ref: 3rd quintile) 0.025 0.002 0.437 0.360 0.556
4th quntile wealth -7.240 -3.284 -0.220 -0.113 -0.239
0.009 0.075 0.033 0.064 0.080
5th quntile wealth -16.386 -9.125 -0.521 -0.104 -0.208
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110 0.150
has DB plan current -14.619 -7.068 -0.170 -0.116 -0.186
job 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.021 0.100
has DC plan current 1.391 0.978 0.072 0.127 0.195
job 0.502 0.481 0.360 0.006 0.054
total HH income 1.145E-05 9.023E-06 1.862E-06 2.998E-07 1.663E-07
0.015 0.003 0.000 0.008 0.412
Social Security wealth 3.657E-04 3.176E-04 1.034E-05 8.626E-06 7.048E-06
age 62 - subjective 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.059
SS accrual age 62 0.760 0.641 0.072 -0.020 0.009
(%) - subjective 0.001 0.001 0.054 0.339 0.574
Current AIME -0.013 -0.011 -3.713E-04 -2.895E-04 -1.733E-04
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.171
t=1998 3.959 2.181 0.104 -0.034 0.206
(ref: t=1996) 0.099 0.133 0.172 0.516 0.066
1-50% of P -6.776 0.059 -0.097 -0.055 -0.064
Control is no tax -4.705 -4.057 -0.105 -0.160 -0.108
51-99% of P 0.187 0.098 0.518 0.054 0.559
-14.991 -12.723 -0.286 -0.262 -0.486
100% if P 0.001 0.000 0.164 0.012 0.031
-9.426 -7.732 -0.408 -0.003 0.201
repeal (REP=1) 0.079 0.045 0.111 0.982 0.431
Control is no tax 1.963 1.253 0.114 -0.161 0.383
1-50% of P X REP 0.640 0.632 0.437 0.098 0.049
9.927 5.944 0.448 0.047 -0.090
51-99% of P X REP 0.053 0.058 0.010 0.688 0.698
10.388 7.505 0.229 0.113 0.217
100% of P X REP 0.040 0.015 0.169 0.329 0.342
-4.431 3.033 0.018 -0.059 -0.375
constant -24.851 -2.351 -0.880 -4.295
0.004 0.697 0.015 0.000
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 4146 4146 4146 3791 3791
rho (share UH) 0.590 0.666 0.462
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective












widow 13.594 11.553 0.342 -0.058 -0.357
(ref: married) 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.442 0.072
divorced 19.702 15.184 0.541 0.241 0.207
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.086
never married 9.570 8.803 0.331 0.021 -0.073
0.060 0.029 0.129 0.850 0.775
black -12.847 -10.125 -0.333 -0.251 -0.387
0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.014
other race -3.127 -2.927 -0.001 0.239 0.114
0.548 0.480 0.997 0.030 0.664
years schooling 3.211 2.556 0.112 0.054 0.111
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
health good -4.291 -2.303 -0.107 -0.039 0.009
0.029 0.107 0.106 0.372 0.920
health fair/poor -7.728 -4.824 -0.281 0.117 -0.128
0.017 0.047 0.014 0.122 0.456
self-employed 24.386 17.424 0.632 0.175 0.281
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.036
tenure current job -0.496 -0.414 -0.016 -0.004 -0.006
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.102 0.226
pressure to retire -6.134 -1.982 -0.044 -0.182 -0.236
< 65 from co-workers 0.042 0.364 0.644 0.008 0.139
transition less 5.961 3.515 0.095 0.184 0.337
demanding job poss. 0.003 0.014 0.148 0.000 0.000
1st quntile wealth 12.048 8.666 0.241 0.186 0.192
0.000 0.000 0.030 0.007 0.187
2nd quntile wealth 7.182 3.564 0.119 0.071 0.012
(ref: 3rd quintile) 0.006 0.059 0.172 0.229 0.922
4th quntile wealth -9.005 -6.605 -0.241 -0.060 -0.145
0.001 0.000 0.005 0.307 0.229
5th quntile wealth -16.844 -11.380 -0.334 -0.130 -0.186
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.042 0.160
has DB plan current -11.278 -6.832 -0.207 -0.173 -0.336
job 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.001
has DC plan current 6.234 2.968 0.085 0.056 -0.009
job 0.002 0.037 0.202 0.208 0.920
total HH income 1.29E-06 -1.95E-06 3.62E-09 3.18E-07 2.34E-07
0.837 0.657 0.987 0.009 0.162
Social Security wealth 1.46E-04 1.25E-04 3.45E-06 8.69E-06 7.35E-06
age 62 - subjective 0.014 0.008 0.154 0.000 0.018
SS accrual age 62 0.226 0.167 0.004 0.004 0.010
(%) - subjective 0.089 0.112 0.485 0.210 0.148
Current AIME -0.006 -0.005 -1.54E-04 -3.56E-04 -2.56E-04
0.023 0.009 0.141 0.000 0.041
t=1998 -0.379 -0.810 0.118 -0.153 0.017
(ref: t=1996) 0.868 0.586 0.059 0.002 0.865
1-50% of P 1.154 0.478 0.114 -0.181 -0.168
Control is no tax 0.706 0.836 0.338 0.008 0.289
51-99% of P 4.066 2.989 0.296 -0.077 0.154
0.352 0.368 0.091 0.421 0.472
100% if P 6.894 6.197 0.579 -0.121 0.034
0.380 0.280 0.071 0.468 0.920
repeal (REP=1) 8.225 4.630 0.326 -0.291 0.195
Control is no tax 0.007 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.171
1-50% of P X REP 1.810 2.394 0.127 0.126 0.101
0.644 0.360 0.264 0.167 0.571
51-99% of P X REP 0.458 1.956 0.066 0.074 -0.171
0.925 0.550 0.647 0.496 0.388
100% of P X REP -6.206 -2.709 -0.365 -0.225 -0.164
0.617 0.736 0.339 0.396 0.702
constant -47.681 -26.799 -1.633 -4.022
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
age dummies yes yes yes yes yes
N 5306 5306 5306 4363 4363
rho (share UH) 0.447 0.632 0.439
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P65 is the subjective




Appendix: P(62) Results 
 
Males tobit P62 RE tobit P62
RE probit 
(P62>0)
repeal (REP=1) 4.596 2.756 0.273
Control is no tax (0.332) (0.364) (0.065)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 1.193 0.453 0.031
(0.837) (0.901) (0.863)
51-99% of P 2.798 1.536 0.007
(0.622) (0.665) (0.968)
100% if P -6.703 5.022 -0.392
(0.536) (0.458) (0.237)
N 4146 4146 4146
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates.
P62 is the subjective probability to work full-time past 62.  
 
Females tobit P62 RE tobit P62
RE probit 
(P62>0)
repeal (REP=1) 5.773 2.757 0.316
Control is no tax (0.083) (0.213) (0.001)
Groups X REP
1-50% of P 0.407 1.022 0.069
(0.924) (0.713) (0.563)
51-99% of P -1.198 1.328 -0.143
(0.824) (0.706) (0.350)
100% if P -10.449 -3.615 -0.069
(0.448) (0.684) (0.867)
N 5306 5306 5306
Notes: Sample of workers aged 51-61 from 1996 to 2002. Pvalue under parameter estimates. P62
is the subjective probability to work full-time past 62. 
 
